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I. Did the appeals court apply the correct legal standard? 























PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
 The Defendants-Appellees below, who are the Petitioners before this Court, are Martin 
County, West Carolina and Martin County Board.   
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 The opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Carolina 
is unreported but may be found on pages 27 through 29 of the appellate record.  (R. at 27–29).  
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit is also unreported 
but may be found on pages 32 through 34 of the appellate record.  (R. at 32–34). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2013.  (R. at 34).  Petitioner filed 
his petition for writ of certiorari on February 7, 2013 (R. at 36).  This Court granted the petition 
on May 20, 2013. (R. at 38).  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error.  Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
 An excerpt from the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is included in the 





STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Board Meetings 
The Martin County Board holds two public meetings per month.  (R. at 12).  In 1985, the 
Board implemented a practice of opening each meeting with a prayer or invocation.  (R. at 27).    
One of the Board members commences each meeting by introducing the selected clergy.  (R. at 
2–5).  For Christian chaplain, the Board members request the audience to stand, singling out any 
non-participants.  Id.  The Board proceeds directly from the invocation into the official meeting, 
offering the audience no distinction between the two.  Id. 
For citizens unable to attend, Martin County maintains videos and minutes of each 
meeting on its website for public access.  (R. at 12).  The videos are archived and can be viewed 
at anytime.  Id.  The online videos chronicle every aspect of the meeting including the prayer.  
Id.     
Town citizens address the Board during the open comments portion of the meetings.  (R. 
at 7, 13).  During this time, the Board asks the individual to approach the podium microphone 
and allows the speaker five minutes to voice their concerns.  (R. at 7).  The Board responds 
immediately to the speaker with suggestions or commitments for future actions.  Id.    
B. Christian Prayers 
Generally, the prayers given at the Martin County Board meetings are Christian.  (R. at 
13).  The Board refuses to instruct the clergy or prevent faith specific references within the 
prayers.  (R. at 13).  However Martin County’s lenient approach results in sermon-like 
invocations.  (R. at 2–5).  In 2011, countless Board meeting prayers incorporated excessive 
references to Christian deities and doctrines.  (R. at 2–5).  The Board’s policy regarding the 
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content of the prayers ensures overtly sectarian invocations and offends the non-Christian 
audience members.  (R. at 2–5, 13).    
C. Clergy Selection 
Volunteers working for the Board privately solicit clergy within Martin County to lead a 
prayer at one of the Board’s meetings.  (R. at 10).  The volunteers record the interested 
congregations on an alphabetical list.  Id.  In preparation for the upcoming meeting, the Board 
selects a prayer giver from the alphabetical list of local clergy.  Id.  Although a conflict of 
interest, Board members may invite clergy from the congregation they regularly attend.  (R. at 
6).  Chairman Gregg Doorley shows preference for his congregation by requesting his pastor to 
lead prayers.  Id.  The Martin County Board maintains no systematic procedures for selecting 
prayer leaders and no rules to prevent a conflict of interest.  (R. at 6, 10).   
D. The Dhaliwals 
Shortly after moving to Martin County, Anne Dhaliwal attended Martin County Board 
meetings from May 2011 to September 2011.  (R. at 13).  On September 9, 2011, Manpreet 
Dhaliwal voiced his concerns to an uncooperative Chairman Gates.  Id.  During his open 
comment, Mr. Dhaliwal requested the Board cease the practice of commencing each meeting 
with openly sectarian prayers.  Id.  The Board commented that Mr. Dhaliwal’s request was 
unusual but stated they would consider his request.  Id.  Following the September meeting, the 
Board ignored Mr. Dhaliwal’s request.  Id.  On October 20, 2011, Ms. Dhaliwal wrote a letter, 
addressed to Chairman Benjamin Gates, reiterating Mr. Dhaliwal’s concerns and requesting a 
meeting.  Id.  Chairman Gates ignored Ms. Dhaliwal’s letter, claiming the Board only addresses 
requests made during the open comments section of the meetings.  (R. at 10).  Selectively 
adhering to its own policies, the Board effectively discriminated against the Dhaliwals.  Id.  The 
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Martin County Board continued to open its meetings with faith-based prayers, disregard the 
complaints, and create a futile pursuit for the Dhaliwals.  (R. at 14).  
E. Proceedings 
 Protecting her First Amendment right, Anne Dhaliwal filed suit against Martin County 
and the Martin County Board requesting that the court declare the prayers given at the Board 
meetings in violation of the U.S. Constitution and enjoining Martin County from permitting the 
prayer practice to continue or ordering the Board to censor the content of the prayers.  (R. at 14–
15).  Martin County filed a motion to dismiss, claiming Dhaliwal did not assert a claim for which 
relief is possible.  (R. at 10).  On Martin County’s motion to dismiss, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of West Carolina rejected Dhaliwal’s claim for an Establishment 
Clause violation.  Relying on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983), the district court 
stated the practice is not coercive or a danger to Dhaliwal’s rights under the First Amendment.  
(R. at 28–29).     
 Anne Dhaliwal appealed the district court’s dismissal.  (R. at 31).  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit performed an analysis, which looked beyond Marsh 
to the subsequent Establishment Clause violation cases.  (R. at 32–34).  Settling on the “totality 
of the circumstances” test from Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 30 (2nd Cir. 2012), 
the Seventeenth Circuit concluded Martin County’s prayer practice constituted a violation of the 
First Amendment Establishment Clause.  (R. at 32–33).  Accordingly, the appellate court 
reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case.  Id.    
 Martin County filed the petition for certiorari, and this Court granted certiorari certifying 
two questions for argument: (1) Did the appeals court apply the correct legal standard; and (2) 
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Does the Martin County legislative prayer practice violate the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause?  (R. at 37).  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
The district court erred in applying the Marsh one factor historical analysis.  The 
historical analysis merely focuses on one insignificant feature of the prayer practice, that it’s 
historic.  Reviewing only one aspect of a potential Establishment Clause violation is insufficient.  
One factor evaluations result in the impermissible approval of unconstitutional practices.  Thus, 
the historical analysis leads to inequitable verdicts, burdening the judicial system.   
The Seventeenth Circuit properly broadened its analysis to the “totality of the 
circumstances.”  The totality standard is especially practical for fact specific cases because it 
objectively reviews all aspects of a potential Establishment Clause violation.  Features of the 
practice may not individually constitute a violation.  However when viewed in its entirety, the 
practice brazenly violates the First Amendment.  Therefore the totality standard is the only 
functional test resulting in impartial judgments.       
II. 
 Martin County’s prayer practice is unconstitutional because it endorses Christianity and 
affiliates the Board with one religion, disfavoring all others.  The Board makes no effort to (1) 
neutralize the content of the prayers; (2) modify its clergy selection procedures; (3) separate 
itself from the messages within the prayers; and (4) refrain from requesting audience 
participation in the prayer.  Viewed in total, the Board’s practice disregards the Establishment 
Clause and infringes upon Anne Dhaliwal’s First Amendment rights.  Left unrestrained, Martin 
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County’s practice will create insurmountable public policy concerns and unravel the fabric of our 
nation. 
ARGUMENT 
I.  THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD, APPLIED BY THE SEVENTEENTH  
CIRCUIT, IS TO ANALYZE THE “TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES” 
The drafters of the Bill of Rights created the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause to 
prevent the government from creating and maintaining one national religion.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. 1.  See  generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1947) (discussing the 
original purpose of the clause).  Since 1947, this Court continues to mold its interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause.  Id.  In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court proclaims a wall should 
separate religion and the government.  Id.  Justice Blackmun concludes the Establishment Clause 
prohibits the government from aiding or advancing any particular religion in County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590–91 (1989).  Additionally, this Court cautions any 
government entity, with or without intent, appearing to prefer one religion over others will 
violate the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 597.  The government may not (1) discriminate against 
individuals based on their religious preferences; (2) assign governmental authority to any church 
or other divine institution; and (3) partake in considerable association with a religious institution.  
Id.  Lastly, the Establishment Clause protects and embraces every citizen’s freedom to choose 
one religion, many religions or non-religion.  See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859 
(2005); accord Zeiman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (maintaining world peace 
requires understanding and respect for diverse religions).   




 There are primarily four tests to determine whether a violation of the Establishment 
Clause exists.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (establishing a 3 prong test); 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (evaluating the historical reference only); 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594 (creating the “endorsement test”); Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30 
(developing the “totality of the circumstances” test).  In Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, this Court 
established its first test for an Establishment Clause violation, evaluating two state statutes 
providing financial aid to religious private schools.  Id.  Chief Justice Burger provides a 
systematic three prong test to determine a violation of the First Amendment.  Id.  The practice 
must (1) contain a “secular legislative” motive; (2) not promote or restrain religion as its primary 
purpose; and (3) not lead to unrestrained “entanglements” of government and religion.  Id.  To be 
deemed constitutional, a practice must satisfy all three parts of the Lemon test.  Id.   
After 1971, the Court utilized the three part test in numerous First Amendment cases.  
See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859–63 (utilizing the first prong of the Lemon test to rule two Ten 
Commandment displays unconstitutional); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602–17 (1988) 
(using the Lemon test to uphold a congressional statute); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 
585–90 (1987) (invalidating a Louisiana statute with the Lemon test).  Although never 
overturned or invalidated, the Lemon test possesses no practical application in today’s fact 
specific cases, and this Court has not applied the test for decades.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 678–79 (1984).        
B. The Totality Standard from Galloway is Practical, Equitable and Promotes   
Legal Efficiency 
Almost two decades after Lemon, this Court again formulated a standard for violations of 
the Establishment Clause in County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594.  Expanding on the third prong 
of the Lemon test, this Court embraced the “endorsement test” and examined the crèche and 
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menorah displays in their contextual locations on government property to determine if they gave 
the impression of endorsing or rejecting a particular religion.  Id.  Refining the Lemon test’s 
intent-based analysis, the reasonable person standard set forth in Allegheny examined the 
practice from an audience perspective, making the endorsement standard easily applicable to 
diverse cases.  See id. (concluding a government action, regardless of intent, must not appear to 
associate the government with any particular religion); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678–79 (recognizing 
only a fraction of any audience will perceive the intended message while others understand the 
“objective” meaning).   
Historical relevance, which led to the holding in Marsh, was only one aspect evaluated 
with the endorsement standard.  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 (applying the Marsh standard would 
legitimize any unconstitutional practice merely because of its traditional significance).  Contra 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786 (upholding legislative prayer because the practice is firmly rooted in the 
customs of the United States).  However in County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603, this Court 
emphasized history alone will not validate an unconstitutional practice.  Thus, a one factor 
analysis is not appropriate for Establishment Clause violation cases.  Id.  Potential violations 
must be reviewed as a whole not based on one feature alone.  Id.        
Following Allegheny, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied 
an endorsement style “totality of the circumstances” standard in Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30.  The 
Second Circuit reviewed the prayer practice of the town meetings using the reasonable person’s 
standard.  Id. at 22.  Although no one feature was unconstitutional, the court held the entire 
practice gave rise to an Establishment Clause violation.  Id. at 26.  Supporting its ruling, the 
Second Circuit noted three issues: (1) the “prayer-giver selection process”; (2) the substance of 
the prayers; and (3) the “actions and inactions” of prayer leaders and Board members.  Id. at 30.  
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The court illustrated the ease of applying the totality standard: if a reasonable person views the 
prayers and concludes the government affiliates, endorses, promotes, or “disparages” one 
religion, the practice is unconstitutional.  Id. at 31.  The Galloway standard is the most functional 
and reasonable test for possible violations of the Establishment Clause.  See id. at 30 (noting the 
impracticability of applying a strict legal test to fact specific cases); See also Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (rejecting the concept of a test replacing “legal judgment” in 
Establishment Clause violation cases).    
C. The Historical Analysis Set Forth in Marsh is Inadequate and Should Not Be  
Adopted 
 Six years before developing the endorsement standard, a member of the Nebraska 
legislature challenged the constitutionality of opening each session with a prayer.  Marsh, 463 
U.S. at 784–85.  Focusing on the historical significance of the practice, this Court held the 
drafters of the Establishment Clause opened their own sessions with a similar prayer and 
certainly did not view it as a violation of the First Amendment.  Id. at 787-88.  Therefore, the 
Court validated Nebraska’s legislative prayer practice.  Id. at 791.    
While deciding Marsh, the Court looks at a very narrow set of facts.  Galloway, 681 F.3d 
at 24.  The Court concluded the prayers were not favoring or “proselytizing” one religion over 
others and as a result, refused to apply the precedential Lemon test.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.  
Instead, the analysis focused on only the historical relevance of the practice.  Id.  The decision 
did not delve into analyzing the content of the prayers.  Id.  Justice Stevens asserts the Court 
avoids the content because it is unable to account for the numerous faith-based references within 
the prayers.  Id. at 823.  Marsh does not provide guidance regarding any additional factors, such 
as the limitations of Establishment Clause and the constitutionality of content within the prayers.  
Id. at 794–95. 
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The Marsh standard analyzes only one aspect of the many utilized in the Allegheny 
“endorsement test.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603.  According the Justice Brennan, the obsession 
with history led this Court to overlook the essence of prayer.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797.  By 
definition, prayers are unmistakably religious.  Id.  As a result, the Marsh standard will lead to a 
government’s blatantly unconstitutional act being overlooked based on the unbalanced reliance 
of a one factor analysis.  The largest pitfall of Marsh is six years following the decision this 
Court decided to forego the Marsh standard in deciding Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594.  Therefore, 
Marsh is an unrepeatable verdict applied to a fact intensive case with no significant precedential 
value.  See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860 (alluding to Marsh is a specially made verdict that 
permitted a practice even though the motive was “presumably religious”); See also Lynch, 463 
U.S. at 695 (dismissing Marsh as the sole inconsistency in Establishment Clause violation cases). 
This Court established the Lemon test to systematically evaluate violations of the 
Establishment Clause.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  After the Lemon test proved difficult to apply, 
Chief Justice Burger attempted to resolve the constitutionality of legislative prayer using merely 
history.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–85.   Recognizing a one factor analysis was insufficient, Justice 
Blackmun molded the third prong of the Lemon test into the “endorsement test” in Allegheny, 
492 U.S. at 594.  Echoing the Allegheny test, the Second Circuit developed the comprehensive 
and workable totality test in Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30.  The Galloway test is simple: when 
viewed in its entirety by a reasonable person, the practice must not advance or condemn any faith 
or belief.  Id. 
II.  MARTIN COUNTY’S LEGISLATIVE PRAYER PRACTICE VIOLATES THE  
FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE THEREBY UNLAWFULLY  
REVOKING DHALIWAL’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
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 According to Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791, the government may open legislative sessions with 
a prayer.  However in Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597, Justice Blackmun clarifies the government 
may not use the prayer practice to endorse or advance one religion.  Additionally, the 
Establishment Clause prohibits government appearance of favoring or criticizing any religion.  
Id.  No government entity may interfere with the freedoms provided by the Establishment 
Clause, such as the right to a religious preference without discrimination.  McCreary Cnty., 545 
U.S. at 859.  
A. Martin County’s Prayer Practice Requires an Analysis Under the Totality   
Standard 
 To evaluate a potential violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause, four 
primary tests exist: the Lemon three prong test, the Marsh historical analysis, the Allegheny 
“endorsement test,” and the Galloway totality standard.  See generally Galloway, 681 F.3d at 14–
30 (providing a history of Establishment Clause violation cases).  This Court abandons the 
Lemon test after struggling to apply it to modern fact intensive cases.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678-79.  
The Marsh historical analysis proves inadequate and inapplicable to this case.  See id. at 695 
(discussing Marsh and its lack of precedential value).  Therefore the Martin County Board’s 
prayer practice must be evaluated using the totality standard from Galloway and the very similar 
endorsement analysis set forth in Allegheny.  Galloway, 681 F.3d at 29.   
B. The Aggregate of Martin County’s Prayer Practice Constitutes a Violation of  
the Establishment Clause 
Viewed comprehensively, Martin County’s prayer practice is problematic.  First, the 
references within the prayers held at the Martin County Board meetings are overtly sectarian and 
offensive.  See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30 (evaluating the substance of the invocations).  The 
Martin County Board opens the majority of their meetings with Christian faith-based prayers.  
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(R. at 13).  In 2010, Christian clergy led the invocation over eighty-one percent of the time.  Id.  
From May to September 2011, non-Christian chaplain led only two prayers.  Id.  Additionally, 
all but one prayer incorporated excessive sermon-like references to Christian deities and 
doctrines.  (R. at 2–5).  Three Martin County prayer presenters were particularly offensive to 
non-Christian audience members.  Id.   Incorporating the audience, Father Samuelson’s directed 
his invocation to “Our Heavenly Father.”   (R. at 2).  Reverend Hector Ramirez assumed the 
audience’s beliefs were similar to his own when he used “us,” “our” and “we” extensively 
throughout his prayer.  (R. at 4).  Julie Lane outrageously requested clarity while “we” continue 
to construct the Lord’s kingdom.  (R. at 4).   
The Board does nothing to prevent discrimination by censoring the content of the 
invocations, and as a result, the unrestrained references clearly derogate non-Christian religions.  
Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (observing prayers with faith intensive 
references are frequently viewed as antagonistic), with  Galloway, 681 F.3d at 31 (asking 
audience members to pray in the name of Christian deities is a loaded request), and Wynne v. 
Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 2004) (invoking gods specific to one faith is 
prejudicial).  Martin County’s predominantly Christian prayer practice places governmental 
approval on one religion, isolating Anne Dhaliwal and other non-Christians. Galloway, 681 F.3d 
at 31–32; See also Zeiman, 536 U.S. at 720 (allowing only prayers of Protestant faith 
discriminated against non-Protestants).    
Second, Martin County’s clergy selection procedures are arbitrary and produce skewed 
results.  See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. (reviewing the process for choosing clergy).  In an 
affidavit submitted to the Seventeenth Circuit, Chairman Benjamin Gates vaguely describes the 
procedures.  (R. at 10).  According to Gates, volunteers send letters to clergy within the county 
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inviting them to participate in the prayer.  Id.  After the clergy responds with interest, their name 
is included on the alphabetical list held by Martin County.  Id.  Once a month, the Board selects 
the next month’s chaplains from the alphabetical list and sends a letter requesting their 
attendance.  Id.   
Choosing clerics within Martin County substantially limits the diversity of the prayers 
and ensures non-Christian religions will be ignored.  See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 27 (selecting 
clergy within the town resulted in exclusively Christian prayer leaders).  Additionally, Martin 
County’s lack of formal procedures provides no guidance for selecting and inviting clergy.  (R. 
at 10).  The non-public invitations sent to a few local clergy, selected by the Board’s volunteers, 
restrict the list of potential prayer leaders, leaving the diverse community misrepresented.  See 
Galloway, 681 F.3d at 27 (publicizing the opportunity to lead invocations is a more acceptable 
method).  Martin County’s unsystematic and informal selection process supports a violation of 
the First Amendment.  Id. 
Third, the Martin County Board’s conduct aligns the town officials with the messages 
contained in the prayers.  See id. at 32 (examining the activities of the clerics and Board 
members).  The Board offers the audience no explanation regarding the purpose of the prayer or 
distinction between the meeting and invocation.  (R. at 2–5).  One of the Martin County Board 
members begins each session by asking the audience to stand for the Christian based prayers.  Id.  
However for the non-Christian invocations, the Board member merely offers the option to stand 
if the audience prefers.  Id.   
The Martin County Board’s refusal to offer clarification affiliates the Board with the 
Christian prayers.  See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30 (disassociating the prayers from the meetings is 
the Board’s responsibility).  Further, the Board requests Dhaliwal’s and other attendees’ 
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participation in the Christian prayers and places non-believers in a state of inner turmoil.  See id. 
at 32 (recognizing the audience’s difficult position).  Non-Christian attendees, such as Dhaliwal 
are confronted with the dilemma of abandoning their own beliefs or publicly disregarding the 
request of the Board.  Id.  Anne Dhaliwal’s and other reasonable attendees’ participation in the 
meeting is subject to their standing for the prayer.  Id.  This pressure to conform is the type of 
discrimination experienced by the drafters of the First Amendment and the very rationale 
underlying the Establishment Clause.  Everson, 330 U.S. at 10–13.  The Martin County Board’s 
requests to stand for the prayers show preference to the Christian faith, pressures the audience to 
favor Christianity, discriminates against individuals with contrary beliefs and violates the 
Establishment Clause.  See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32–33 (illustrating the attendee’s reasonable 
inferences resulting from the Board member’s request).  
 Through overtly Christian references within the prayers, unsystematic selection 
procedures and conduct of the members, the Martin County Board expresses a preference for 
Christianity.  Id. at 30.  Viewed in its entirety by a reasonable person, the invocations align the 
Board with one religion, violating the Establishment Clause.  Id.  Pressuring Dhaliwal to 
suppress her own beliefs for purposes of participating in the meetings, the Martin County Board 
denies her fundamental right to practice any religion without government discrimination. See 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985) (noting the First Amendment religion clauses have a 
symbiotic relationship, protecting each citizen’s right to select their own beliefs and to reject the 
predominant religion).     
C. Public Policy Concerns Support Adopting the Totality Standard 
In Marsh, the Court evades the Lemon test by focusing on a one factor analysis and 
approves a practice with conspicuous spiritual motives.  McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860.  In 
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Lynch, 465 U.S. at 695, Justice Brennan asserts Marsh uniquely deviated from the typical 
evaluation of Establishment Clause cases.  The Marsh analysis is distinctive, and although 
frequently referenced, this Court has never repeated the analysis in any subsequent cases.  See id.  
(applying Marsh analysis to no other cases and anticipating no future departures from the 
accepted standards).  The facts of the Marsh case, evaluated by the standards developed in 
Lemon, Allegheny and Galloway, prove to be a violation of the Establishment Clause.  See 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (disapproving Marsh under the Lemon test); See also Allegheny, 492 
U.S. at 594 (developing the Lemon test’s third prong into the “endorsement test”); Galloway, 681 
F.3d at 30 (progressing from the “endorsement test” to the similar totality standard).  The Marsh 
opinion forms an exception to precedent and shockingly approves a violation of the First 
Amendment.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796.  As a result, the Marsh standard promotes an unjust and 
inconsistent judicial system full of arbitrary verdicts.  Id.     
Incorporating Lemon and Allegheny, the totality standard of Galloway fairly and 
objectively evaluates the entire situation.  Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30.  Martin County does not 
censor the prayers and is unable to control every word spoken by the selected clergy.  (R. at 10).  
As a result, the constitutionality of the prayer practice should not be judged solely on the content 
of the prayers.  See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 34 (holding individually, the features of the invocation 
practice did not constitute a violation, but viewed in total, the practice is unconstitutional).  
However, Martin County is able to control other aspects of the practice, such as the chaplain 
selection process and preventing their behavior from associating the Board with the prayers.  Id.  
The totality standard allows Martin County and other government entities to offset aspects 
outside of their control with ones inside their control, resulting in predictability in the law.  See 
id. (indicating the excessive Christian based references within the prayers were not enough to 
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violate the Establishment Clause).  Thus, the “totality of the circumstances” test provides 
equitable judgments and encourages efficiency in the judicial system.   
Society demands predictability and structure within the law.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 331 (1989).  Precedent is crucial in the United States judicial system because it promotes 
efficiency and provides the structure by which citizens are able to predict the outcome of their 
behaviors.  Id.  More importantly, precedent ensures individuals receive fair treatment without 
arbitrary, unreliable verdicts.  Id.  While the Marsh standard undermines the American legal 
system, the Galloway totality test advances society’s interests.  
CONCLUSION 
Religious freedoms are the first fundamental rights secured by the drafters of the Bill of 
Rights.  The First Amendment promises all citizens the right to choose their own beliefs without 
government interference.  Martin County, through its prayer practice, is promoting Christianity 
at the expense of all other religions and unlawfully violating Anne Dhaliwal’s First Amendment 
rights.  For the preceding reasons, Dhaliwal requests this Court affirm the Seventeenth Circuit’s 
judgment. 
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FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
 
